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Abstract: Grounding and explanation are said to be intimately connected. Some 
even maintain that grounding just is a form of explanation. But grounding and 
explanation also seem importantly different—on the face of it, the former is 
‘worldy’ or ‘objective’ while the latter isn’t. In this paper, we develop and 
respond to an argument to the effect that there is no way to fruitfully address 
this tension that retains orthodox views about grounding and explanation but 
doesn’t undermine a central piece of methodology, namely that explanation is a 
guide to ground.  
1. Introduction 
There is a tension in theorizing about grounding (Bliss 2018, Kovacs 2019, and Raven 
2015). One way to cast the tension is in terms of conflation. Grounding theorists 
typically maintain that there is an intimate link between grounding and explanation. 
Some even claim that grounding just is a form of explanation. But in tying grounding so 
closely to explanation, they run the risk of jumbling together issues that should be kept 
separate, specifically metaphysical issues regarding how reality is ‘in itself’ with issues 
that more properly belong to other subject matters such as epistemology and the 
philosophy of mind and language. An alternative, but closely related, way to cast the 
tension is in terms of coherence. Many conceive of grounding as a ‘worldly’ or 
‘objective’ phenomenon, while explanation is thought to at least partially involve how 
subjects represent the world. Yet, if so, how could grounding and explanation be bound 
together in the way that grounding theorists maintain? 
At the same time, explanatory language plays a prevalent role in theorizing about 
grounding. It has at least two uses: to communicate what grounds what and to motivate 
principles about how grounding behaves. For an example of the first use, Dasgupta 
(2014, p. 1) writes that what explains why a conference is taking place are certain facts 
about the intentional attitudes and activities of its participants; these ground the fact 
that the conference is taking place. Others similarly communicate what grounds what 
with the aid of this and other explanation-indicating idioms like “because”, “in virtue 
of”, “accounts for”, and so on (Audi 2012, Litland 2015, and Schaffer 2009). For an 
example of the second use, Raven (2013, p. 193) writes that since a fact is explained by 
the facts that ground it, and since a fact cannot explain itself, no fact can ground itself. 
Others offer essentially the same arguments for the claims that grounding is 
asymmetric, non-monotonic, and hyperintensional (Rosen 2010, Schaffer 2009, and 
Trogdon 2013).1    
 
1 For ease of presentation, we speak of grounding as a relation between facts. The 
discussion could be recast, however, in a less committal fashion where grounding instead is 
treated as an operation.   
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Before proceeding, let’s think a bit more carefully about the role that explanation is 
playing here. Consider the following schemas:   
EXPLANATION: Explanation has such-and-such features.  
INFERENCE: If explanation has such-and-such features, then we have on this basis 
(defeasible) reason to think that grounding has those features.    
Let INHERITANCE be the conjunction of EXPLANATION and INFERENCE. It’s clear that 
INHERITANCE or something like it underlies the second use that grounding theorists have 
put explanation to that we described above. We read Raven in particular as proposing 
instances of EXPLANATION and INFERENCE, specifically  
Explanation is irreflexive. 
If explanation is irreflexive, then we have on this basis reason to think that 
grounding is irreflexive. 
and concludes on this basis that grounding is irreflexive. What is perhaps less obvious is 
that INHERITANCE underlies the first use as well. We read Dasgupta in particular as 
proposing instances of special cases of EXPLANATION and INFERENCE, roughly 
The link between thus-and-so facts about the participants and the conference taking 
place is an instance of constitutive explanation.  
 
If this link is an instance of constitutive explanation, then we have on this basis 
reason to think that it’s an instance of grounding.   
and concludes on this basis that thus-and-so facts about the participants ground the fact 
there is a conference taking place.2  
Let’s understand the claim that explanation is a guide to ground as the claim that there 
are instances of INHERITANCE that are both substantive (like the two proposed above) and 
true. We inherit the inheritance terminology from Maurin (2019) who offers a similar 
take on the role that explanation plays in cases like those described above. What Maurin 
calls “Inheritance” is the principle that “…explanation [having] whatever properties it 
does gives us reason—it justifies—our thinking that grounding does too” (p. 1577). So 
talk of inheritance in this context targets in the first instance epistemic considerations 
rather than, say, something like a metaphysical relation of property inheritance.3 
 
2 An auxiliary assumption in these arguments as we reconstructed them is that there are no 
strong countervailing considerations suggesting that grounding doesn’t have the feature in 
question (e.g., being irreflexive).  
3 While we focus on INHERITANCE, there are further ways in which reflection on explanation 
might usefully guide theorizing about grounding. Some claim, for example, that it’s 
necessary that if some facts ground another fact, then the former explain the latter. If this 
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2. A challenge 
These two threads can be drawn together, the tension described above and the thought 
that explanation is a guide to ground. There is an interesting argument that can be 
fashioned out of aspects of recent discussions of grounding to the effect that there is no 
way to address this tension that retains orthodox views about grounding and 
explanation but doesn’t undermine the idea that INHERITANCE has substantive and true 
instances. Two competing frameworks about how to understand the interface between 
grounding and explanation, what Raven (2015, p. 326) dubs “unionism” and 
“separatism”, provide scaffolding for the argument.  
As we understand unionism, proponents of this view stipulate that grounding, rather 
than being a form of determination, is a form of non-causal or constitutive explanation, 
what we will call explanationG (Dasgupta 2017, Litland 2015, and Rosen 2010). For them, 
to say that the bowl’s brittleness is grounded in the ionic bonds of its constituent atoms 
is in the first instance to say that the bowl is brittle ‘because’ these bonds are ionic, that 
it’s brittle ‘in virtue of’ the ionic bonding, or that the brittleness is ‘accounted for’ by the 
bonding.  
As we understand separatism, proponents of this view stipulate that grounding, rather 
than being a form of explanation, is a form of determination, which we will call 
determinationG, that backs explanation (Audi 2012, Schaffer, 2016a, Trogdon 2013). For 
them, to say that the bowl’s brittleness is grounded in the ionic bonds of its constituent 
atoms is in the first instance to say that these bonds non-causally ‘generate’, ‘produce’, 
or ‘bring about’ the bowl’s brittleness.4 
It would seem that the choice between unionism and separatism so characterized isn’t a 
merely terminological decision, pace Dasgupta 2017, fn. 8 and Kovacs 2020 (cf. Maurin 
2019, fn. 9). Unionists are committed to there being instances of a distinctive form of 
explanation and providing an account of what it’s like. They don’t have a corresponding 
commitment regarding any form of determination. For separatists, things go in the 
reverse. 
Note that merely adopting unionism or separatism doesn’t on its own resolve the 
tension described above. As for unionism, adopting this thesis (and leaving it at that) has 
the effect of deepening the tension. If the intimate connection between grounding and 
(the relevant form of) explanation is one of identity, then the tension apparently 
involves an outright contradiction, as in this case we seem to be ascribing incompatible 
features to grounding. We don’t encounter the same problem with separatism. But if 
the relevant notion of backing is left uncharacterized (as it in fact normally is), we’re left 
with a proposal about the interface between grounding and explanation that lacks any 
real content. While in this case we might not be attributing incompatible properties to 
 
principle is correct, then from what doesn’t explain what we can infer what doesn’t ground 
what.  
4 The ‘determinationG’ and ‘explanationG’ terminology is due to Skiles and Trogdon (2019).  
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grounding, we’ve nevertheless failed to grapple with the nature (specifically, the 
intimate nature) of the connection between grounding and explanation.  
What is most important for our purposes is that, not only does adopting either unionism 
or separatism on its own fail to resolve the tension described above, but apparently 
doing so has the effect of undermining rather than undergirding appeals to INHERITANCE, 
given orthodox views about grounding and explanation. It’s this idea that is the main 
focus of the paper. It will be helpful to settle on some further terminology before 
proceeding.   
The term “fully objective” and related terms are used in a variety of ways in philosophy. 
And their usage is largely stipulative, as it is here. For our purposes, to say that 
something is fully objective means that it isn’t by its nature subject involving. We will 
have more to say about the “by its nature” part of this conception of objectivity later; 
for now, let’s focus on the “subject involving” part.  
While we don’t have a definition of subject involvement to offer, the notion is fairly 
intuitive and we can identify various sufficient conditions. For example, grounding is by 
its nature subject involving if it’s essential to grounding that some facts D ground some 
fact A only if certain epistemic conditions (e.g., subject x is in a position to understand 
certain propositions concerning D and A) obtain. The same goes for psychological 
conditions (e.g., x possesses concepts that express properties constitutive of A and facts 
among D), pragmatic conditions (e.g., x is interested in the subject matter of thus-and-
so propositions in thus-and-so context), and linguistic conditions (e.g., thus-and-so is the 
circumstance of evaluation for “D grounds A”). Plausibly, electrons aren’t by their nature 
subject involving in the relevant sense—it’s not part of what it is to be an electron that if 
x is an electron, then x satisfies such a condition. Knowledge, by contrast, isn’t fully 
objective—clearly part of what it is for x to know <p> is that certain epistemic conditions 
are satisfied.5  
Stronger and weaker varieties of subject involvement emerge depending on what type 
of subject the variable x is supposed to range over. For example, a relatively strong type 
of subject involvement would take x to range over every actual, presently existing 
person (of some specified type), while a relatively weak type of subject involvement 
would take x to range over merely possible idealized agents (of some specified type). 
Since nothing will turn on what strength of subject involvement one attributes to 
grounding, we will continue to speak loosely. 
Let minimal grounding realism be the thesis that some facts ground other facts. 
According to strong grounding realism, some facts ground other facts (minimal 
grounding realism) and grounding is fully objective. According to weak grounding 
realism, some facts ground other facts, yet grounding isn’t fully objective. There are 
corresponding theses about explanation as well. Let minimal explanatory realism be the 
thesis that facts to the effect that this explains that obtain. According to strong 
explanatory realism, minimal explanatory realism is true and explanation is fully 
 
5 For a contrasting take on objectivity, one according to which knowledge may count as 
being fully objective, see Rosen 1994.  
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objective. According to weak explanatory realism, minimal explanatory realism is true 
yet explanation isn’t fully objective.6 
For various putative conditions on grounding or explanation, whether they should count 
as epistemic, psychological, pragmatic, or linguistic conditions in the relevant sense (i.e., 
whether their figuring into the nature of grounding or explanation would render them 
subject involving) depends in part on one’s views about the features the conditions 
concern. Consider, for example, the following two familiar claims: for any explanation, 
its explanans logically entails its explanandum; and, for any explanation, its explanans 
raises the probability of its explanandum. The idea that these conditions should count 
as, say, epistemic conditions in the relevant sense is perhaps most plausible on certain 
intuitionist accounts of logical consequence and subjective interpretations of 
probability. For our purposes, we can remain neutral on these substantive issues.  
Strong grounding realism is a standard assumption among grounding theorists, as is 
minimal explanatory realism. These are the orthodox assumptions about grounding and 
explanation alluded to above, the ones at issue in the argument we wish to consider. 
The argument takes the form of a dilemma: either unionism or separatism is true; 
unionism undermines appeals to INHERITANCE given strong grounding realism and 
minimal explanatory realism; separatism undermines appeals to INHERITANCE given the 
same assumptions; hence, either explanation isn’t a guide to ground or strong 
grounding realism or minimal explanatory realism is false.  
Let’s begin with the third premise, the separatism premise. Why think that it’s true? The 
argument for the separatism premise also proceeds by a dilemma. Given minimal 
explanatory realism, either strong or weak explanatory realism is true. Suppose that 
strong explanatory realism is true. Given separatism and strong grounding realism, in 
this case grounding and explanation are different but similar in a key respect—each is 
fully objective. But strong explanatory realism vitiates EXPLANATION—if explanation is 
fully objective, then any (non-trivial) instance of EXPLANATION is unmotivated. According 
to Thompson, on fully objective conceptions of explanation, “…we lose our grasp on 
what metaphysical explanation actually is” (2016, p. 397). Maurin agrees, claiming that 
in this case, “what properties [explanation] has becomes somewhat of a mystery” (2019, 
p. 1579). Explanations so conceived are “radically different” from explanations as we 
normally conceive of them, and “ideas we have about the nature of explanation are 
based on experiences we have with ‘normal’ explanation” (p. 1581). Returning to the 
instances of EXPLANATION that Raven and Dasgupta propose, in this case we lack reason 
 
6 Dasgupta (2017, p. 89), Thompson (2018, p. 25), and others use “realism” about grounding 
and explanation for views similar to what we call “strong realism”. And note that, while 
we’re assuming that grounding is a relation between facts (see note 1), the theses above can 
be recast so that they don’t directly appeal to facts. Focusing on nominal quantification, we 
can understand minimal grounding and explanatory realism as (roughly) the views that there 
are true grounding and explanation claims, respectively. As for objectivity, we can say, for 
example, that grounding is subject involving if it’s necessary that a grounding claiming is true 
only if subjects are in a position to understand the content of that claim.  
 6 
to believe that explanation is irreflexive and that thus-and-so facts concerning the 
participants constitutively explain the occurrence of the conference. 
Turning to the second horn, suppose instead that weak explanatory realism is true.  
Given separatism and strong grounding realism, in this case grounding and explanation 
are importantly different—the former is fully objective, while the latter isn’t. And this 
vitiates INFERENCE. As grounding and explanation aren’t analogous in this case, any (non-
trivial) inference conforming to INFERENCE is unlicensed. According to Maurin if 
explanation is “mind-involving”, “pragmatic”, or “epistemic” while grounding instead is 
a “mind independently obtaining worldly relation”, then it’s not the case that 
“explanation having the properties it does… justifies our thinking that those are 
properties had by… grounding” (2019, pp. 1578–9). Returning to the instances of 
INFERENCE that Raven and Dasgupta propose, in this case explanation being irreflexive 
doesn’t give us reason to believe that grounding is irreflexive, and thus-and-so facts 
about the participants constitutively explaining the occurrence of the conference 
doesn’t give us reason to think that this is an instance of grounding. 
So much for the rationale for the separatism premise. What is the rationale for the 
unionism premise? Grounding is fully objective (strong grounding realism). And, since 
grounding is explanationG (unionism), it follows that explanationG (the sense of 
explanation relevant to EXPLANATION) is fully objective as well: “…if grounding is a worldly 
relation which obtaining or not is an entirely mind-independent affair, and if grounding 
is (metaphysical) explanation, metaphysical explanation is a worldly and mind-
independently obtaining relation as well (Maurin 2019, 1579). But fully objective 
conceptions of explanation render explanation obscure to the point that (non-trivial) 
instances of EXPLANATION are unmotivated, as noted above.7   
3. A response to the challenge 
How should we respond to the overall argument? If the unionism and separatism 
premises are true, then there are various combinations of views you might hold. One is 
to reject INHERITANCE and endorse strong grounding realism, weak explanatory realism, 
and either unionism or separatism (Maurin 2019). Another is to reject strong grounding 
realism and endorse weak grounding and explanatory realism, INHERITANCE, and 
separatism or unionism (Dasgupta 2017, Thompson 2018). Still another is to reject 
minimal grounding realism and endorse minimal explanatory realism (Wilson 2018).8 
We, however, are going to pursue a different response. 
 
7 Provided that explanation in general is fully objective if explanationG is fully objective, 
strong explanatory realism follows from explanationG being fully objective. And if strong 
explanatory realism is true, then so too is minimal explanatory realism. In this case one of 
the starting assumptions (minimal explanatory realism) is entailed by the other (strong 
grounding realism) together with unionism.    
8 If INHERITANCE is out, then an important question concerns what other general principles 
might guide our theorizing about grounding. Given separatism, one possibility is to appeal to 
principles corresponding to EXPLANATION and INFERENCE formulated in terms of determination 
rather than explanation. Audi (2012), for example, claims that, since determination 
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3.1. Separatism and strong explanatory realism  
Our focus is the separatism premise, and our view is that the first horn in the argument 
for this premise (strong explanatory realism is true) can be safely embraced. Here’s our 
strategy: we first outline a version of weak explanatory realism that doesn’t render 
instances of EXPLANATION unmotivated; then we outline a very similar approach to 
explanation that conforms to strong explanatory realism. The thought is that, if the 
former doesn’t vitiate EXPLANATION, neither does the latter. 
As will become clear below, our proposal appeals to the distinction between 
explanation per se and good or successful explanation.9 The version of strong 
explanatory realism we consider targets the former, and the overall idea is that the 
latter rather than the former is essentially subject involving. We should note that 
Thompson anticipates a response along these lines, claiming that good or successful 
explanation, but not explanation per se, is “apparent to us”—it’s features of good or 
successful explanations, rather than features of explanations per se, that we’re “aware 
of”, so “…any useful connection between grounding and metaphysical explanation is a 
connection between grounding and an agent-relative notion of explanation” (2016, p. 
398). The discussion below can be viewed as an attempt to show that Thompson is 
wrong on this score.   
It will be helpful to begin with some general comments about how separatists might 
conceive of explanation. As we noted above, separatists claim that determinationG 
backs explanation. We also noted that it’s desirable in this context to have a substantive 
characterization of the relevant notion of backing. A sensible way of understanding 
backing is in terms of representation—to back involves being represented.  
While there are perhaps different ways of proceeding here, we focus on a proposal 
according to which explanation is doubly representational. First, explanation is 
representational in the sense that the relata of explanation are propositions, where 
propositions themselves are understood to be representations. Second, explanation is 
representational in that at least part of what it is for <p> to explain <q> is for there to be 
an explanatory model whose representational content can be characterized in terms of 
set of propositions with <p> and <q> as elements that satisfies various conditions. These 
include conditions on what the content of the model might be (more on this below).10 
Suppose that there is an explanatory model relative to which <p> explains <q>, where 
each of these propositions represent facts. One way for this model (i.e., the explanation 
 
(considered as a genus with determinationG as a species) is non-monotonic, so too is 
grounding. Relatedly, Audi appeals to something like the converse of INFERENCE: “Given that 
determination is… irreflexive and asymmetrical, it will be no surprise that explanation has 
these features if one job of explanations is to report underlying relations of determination” 
(2015, p. 211).  
9 Skiles and Trogdon (2019) float a similar proposal but don’t develop it in any detail.   
10 For discussions of models in the context of mechanistic explanation in the sciences, see 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) and Kaplan and Bechtel (2011).  
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of <q> in terms of <p>) to be backed by determinationG is for part of the model’s 
content to be that one of these facts determinesG the other.11  
The version of weak explanatory realism that we will frame our discussion in terms of is 
what Kim (2010, p. 149) calls “explanatory realism”. While Kim doesn’t explicitly talk 
about models, it’s sensible to understand his proposal as saying that part of what it is to 
be an explanation is to be a model that meets at least two conditions. First, part of the 
content of the model is that particular ontic relations are instantiated. On one proposal, 
these relations include causal, nomic, and statistical relevance relations (Craver 2019). 
Provided that determinationG is an ontic relation, this condition in effect bakes the 
tracking of grounding into the nature of explanation, given separatism. Second, when 
<p> explains <q> relative to a model, we (or perhaps idealized versions of ourselves) 
must stand in certain relations to the content of the model. One proposal is that the 
model’s content must be epistemically available in that it can be “recognized, surveyed, 
or appreciated” (Woodward 2003, p. 23). Call these the ontic condition and subject 
condition, respectively.  
It’s the subject condition that makes explanation so conceived not fully objective in the 
relevant sense of ‘fully objective’. Importantly, representations figuring into the nature 
of explanation is compatible with explanation being fully objective. To see why, note 
that representation plausibly figures into the nature of alethic properties like being true. 
Part of what it is to be this property is that such-and-such way of representing the world 
is true just in case the world is in fact how that representation depicts it. Alethic 
properties, however, are paradigmatic examples of fully objective phenomena in the 
relevant sense. The moral is that, while explanation essentially involving representation 
doesn’t make it not fully objective, it being such that it essentially involves 
representations that satisfy epistemic, psychological, pragmatic, or linguistic conditions 
does.12 
Maurin points to Kim’s version of weak explanatory realism as an approach that doesn’t 
vitiate EXPLANATION—it’s clear in this case “what saying of something that it is ‘an 
explanation’ is supposed to signal” (2019, p. 580). The thought is that separatists who 
endorse something like Kim’s approach to explanation (e.g., Audi 2012, Schaffer 2016a, 
Trogdon 2018) are in a position to make substantive and well-motivated claims about 
what explanation is like.13 
 
11 A proposition being part of the content of an explanatory model doesn’t automatically 
require that the proposition itself be an element of that model. Hence, it may be that a 
model represents an instance of determinationG yet no proposition to the effect that this 
determinesG that is an element of the model. 
12 This isn’t to say, however, that truth isn’t importantly related to phenomena that aren’t 
fully objective in our sense. As we noted earlier, knowledge is by its nature subject involving, 
as clearly part of what it is for someone to know <p> is that certain epistemic conditions are 
satisfied. Truth, itself something fully objective, is a necessary condition for knowledge, 
something which itself isn’t fully objective.   
13 Trogdon’s (2018) discussion is framed explicitly in terms of models. Trogdon proposes that 
the models relevant to this form of explanation represent not only grounding relations but 
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Now we turn to the similar approach to explanation that instead is a version of strong 
explanatory realism. Our point of departure is the thought that we ought to distinguish 
between giving a theory of the epistemology of explanation and an epistemic theory of 
explanation, and that we might embrace the former project while rejecting the latter 
(Kitcher and Salmon 1987). The following proposal conforms to this idea: while the ontic 
condition figures into the nature of explanation, the subject condition (which covers 
epistemic factors) doesn’t; instead, this condition, along with the ontic condition, figures 
into the nature of good or successful explanation. While Kim’s view is just about the 
nature of explanation, this view is about the nature of explanation and the nature of 
good or successful explanation. And it counts as a version of strong explanatory realism, 
for in this case explanation itself is thought to be fully objective.14 
Illari (2013, p. 241) is particularly clear in distinguishing the project of providing a theory 
of explanation from that of providing a theory of good or successful explanation. 
Regarding explanation in the sciences, the later project concerns “the standards that we 
hold scientific explanations to, to make them good explanations”, and the former the 
“norms or any other criteria [that] make something an explanation at all.” While silent 
on the issue of what it is to be a scientific explanation, Illari does develop an account of 
what it is to be a good or successful scientific explanation. And the proposal has the 
same structure as the proposal we just set out: with respect to mechanistic explanation 
in the sciences in particular, to be a good or successful explanation is to be a model 
whose content is that particular causal mechanisms behave in certain ways (the ontic 
condition), where this model puts us in a position to understand, manipulate, and 
communicate how certain entities, activities, and their organization produce 
phenomena (the subject condition).  
This is why these considerations are important: when we shift from Kim’s take on 
explanation to the corresponding version of strong explanatory realism, we don’t 
suddenly loose our footing in making judgments about the nature of explanation. It’s 
simply not credible to maintain that this version of strong explanatory realism renders 
explanation obscure—it doesn’t turn explanation into some we-know-not-what. The 
claim that, say, explanation is irreflexive is apparently just as secure on this version of 
strong explanatory realism as it is on Kim’s view. Hence, the first horn of the argument 
for the separatism premise seems to fail. 
The strategy here is to start with Kim’s approach to explanation, revise it so that the 
subject condition doesn’t figure into the nature of explanation but rather something 
else near at hand, and then point out that the resulting conception of explanation 
doesn’t render explanation obscure. It’s worth noting that there are other ways of 
implementing this strategy as well. Following Skiles and Trogdon (2019), one appeals to 
 
the more specific metaphysical relations (e.g., the determinate-determinable relation) 
holding between constituents of the grounded and what grounds them.  
14 We assume that explanation is factive in the sense that any explanation is such that it’s 
explanans and explananda are true. Hence, good/successful explanations aren’t merely true 
explanations, as all explanations are true. It’s instead facts concerning subject involvement 
that determine whether an explanation is a good/successful explanation.  
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the distinction between what is part of the nature of a plurality of things vs. what is part 
of the nature of any individual amongst this plurality.  
Here is the idea. Although it’s plausible to think that it’s essential to Socrates and Plato 
taken together that they be distinct, it’s implausible to think that it’s essential to either 
Socrates or Plato alone that they be distinct, given that it’s implausible to think that 
there are any essential truths about the one that concern the other (Fine 1994, p. 54). 
Consider again the subject condition in Kim’s approach to explanation. To fix ideas, let’s 
understand the subject condition as follows: a model is an explanation only if its content 
potentially increases our understanding (Maurin 2019, p. 1580). Call this version of the 
subject condition the understanding condition. Now compare the following claims: (i) 
the understanding condition is an essential truth about (it specifies part of the nature 
of) explanation; and (ii) this condition is an essential truth about explanation and 
understanding taken together. If the second claim is true while the first is false, 
explanation (for all we have said, anyway) is fully objective. After all, it’s also an 
essential truth about understanding taken together with whatever fully objective 
phenomenon you choose—say, photosynthesis—that they are distinct. But the fact that 
understanding figures into an essential truth about understanding and photosynthesis 
taken together is obviously no reason for believing that photosynthesis isn’t fully 
objective. Similarly, we say, in the case at hand. And the resulting conception of 
explanation, like last time, doesn’t render explanation obscure, at least in the absence 
of further argument.   
3.2. Separatism and weak explanatory realism 
Given what we’ve said above, it’s not necessary to show that we can also safely 
embrace the second horn of the argument (weak explanatory realism is true) for the 
separatism premise. But there are at least two reasons to question the idea that 
grounding (determinationG) being fully objective and explanation not being fully 
objective renders inferences conforming to INFERENCE unlicensed.  
First, it’s unclear why this difference with respect to objectivity should spoil the analogy 
between them. The thought, of course, can’t be that any difference between grounding 
and explanation would do so, as the whole point of an argument from analogy is to 
provide support for the idea that qualitatively distinct phenomena are similar in some 
key respect.  
Second, it may be that a general principle underlies the reasoning at issue with the 
second horn of the argument, one that would be clearly inappropriate to appeal to in 
this context. The principle we have in mind is a general prohibition against inferences 
moving from the not fully objective to the fully objective. This is clearly too blunt of an 
instrument, as it apparently rules out inferences from appearance to reality. Something 
has clearly gone wrong if our objection to the role that INHERITANCE plays in theorizing 
about grounding implicitly involves denying the possibility of perceptual knowledge!    
We imagine that Maurin or Thompson might respond that, given weak explanatory 
realism and strong grounding realism, the real issue is why we should think that 
explanation and grounding are analogous in the first place. But if there is a demand here 
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for a demonstrative argument, one whose premises have better epistemic credentials 
that its conclusion, it may be that the concern is misguided. As Cameron (2008) 
observes, if we’re going to do metaphysics at all, we seem to have no choice but to 
begin with some principles for which no demonstrative arguments can be supplied. 
Perhaps we should treat the claim that explanation and grounding are analogous simply 
as a reasonable starting point for our theorizing about grounding.  
Are there considerations, however, that support the claim that grounding and 
explanation are analogous, assuming that grounding is fully objective (strong grounding 
realism), while explanation isn’t (weak explanatory realism)? We can think of two 
potential reasons. The first concerns the role that regimentation plays in theorizing 
about grounding.  
It seems that the choice between regimentations of grounding discourse is in part a 
pragmatic affair—we should, all other things being equal, adopt whatever 
regimentation that is most useful to our theorizing. Grounding theorists initially 
conceive of grounding as being closely connected to explanation. It’s therefore natural 
for them to develop regimentations of grounding discourse that codify and elucidate 
this connection—doing so clearly serves their theoretical interests given their starting 
point. So what? Well, provided that you think that F is an important feature of 
explanation (e.g., irreflexivity), it’s therefore no surprise that grounding by your lights 
has F as well, as it’s precisely this view about explanation that led you to work with a 
regimentation according to which grounding is F in the first place. So, guided by the idea 
that explanation is, say, asymmetric, we can imagine adopting a linguistic policy 
according to which a necessary condition for using the term ‘grounding’ correctly is that 
that symmetric inferences (e.g., if A grounds B, then B grounds A) are never licensed. In 
this case, wondering whether grounding is closely tied to explanation is like wondering 
whether 'Proto-Indo-European' refers to a language from which the Indo-European 
languages split off, where the term was explicitly introduced to refer to such a 
hypostasized language.15 
In this case, appeals to INHERITANCE aren’t so much knowledge extending as they are 
indirect expressions of the choices we’ve made or are inclined to make concerning 
regimentation. This proposal, if true, would explain why Raven and others baldly assert 
claims of the form “Grounding is F because explanation is F” rather than provide 
arguments for such claims. They don’t offer arguments in this case because they’re 
merely describing grounding in a way that signals the structuring role that explanation 
plays in the regimentation of grounding discourse. In this case we can still think of 
INHERITANCE as a guide to ground—it’s just that the principle connects with the project of 
regimentation in way that it isn’t obvious on first inspection.    
As the choice between regimentations of grounding discourse is in part pragmatic in 
nature, does the proposal above not vitiate the full objectivity of grounding? This 
depends on your general picture of the role that regimentation plays in the enterprise of 
metaphysics. One view is that there are many fully objective relations “out there” and 
our choices concerning regimentation simply allow us to home in on one in particular 
 
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this example.   
 12 
that is of interest to us. This view also comes in deflationary flavors, such as 
Thomasson’s (2015, Ch. 3) so-called ‘easy ontology’ approach with its liberal meta-
semantics that near-guarantees that our relational predicates will select some relation 
or other. Another view is that there are no fully objective relations, there is just the 
matter of systematizing the way we talk about things.  
The second potential reason to think that grounding and explanation are analogous, 
despite their difference with respect to objectivity, concerns the relationship between 
the evidence for positing grounding and the evidence for positing certain axioms that 
specify how grounding behaves. According to Schaffer (2016b), there are cases in which 
the evidence that supports a fundamental posit also supports the posit axiomatized in a 
certain way. For Schaffer, one such case of philosophical interest involves non-Humean 
laws of nature. The thought is that the evidence we have for non-Humean laws—
roughly, inference to the best explanation for regularities in nature—also supports non-
Humean laws outfitted with an axiom according to which they entail these regularities.  
Perhaps something similar can be said in the case of grounding, as Schaffer himself 
suggests. While Schaffer focuses on the justification for axioms specifying different 
grounding connections (e.g., grounding between facts with determinate and 
determinable properties as constituents), we focus on a different idea. Why think that 
there is grounding in the first place? Given the separatist conception of grounding, you 
might think that our evidence for this posit consists in part from inference to the best 
explanation of the pattern of instantiation of a certain form of non-causal or constitutive 
explanation (perhaps what unionists identify as grounding). The explanandum in this 
case: why do these propositions non-causally explain those? Proposal: the best 
explanation is that the former represent facts that ground facts represented by the 
latter.16 And you might think that this evidence also supports grounding outfitted with 
certain axioms, ones that mirror axioms we already accept that describe the behavior of 
explanation. Were the formal features of grounding very different from those of 
explanation, the patterns of instantiation of grounding wouldn’t align with the patterns 
of instantiation of the relevant form of non-causal or constitutive explanation. Returning 
to irreflexivity, the thought is that grounding being irreflexive is part of what enables 
grounding to do the explanatory work that it was invoked to do in the first place.    
4. Implications: unionism and further issues 
Above we attempted to undermine the rationale for the separatism premise in the 
general argument for the claim that explanation isn’t a guide to ground given standard 
assumptions about grounding and explanation. In this section we trace out some 
implications of our discussion.  
 
 
16 Kovacs (2020) understands talk of backing in terms of explanation—he would see the 
claim that grounding facts explain certain explanation facts as a consequence of the claim 
that grounding backs explanation. This goes beyond our representational conception of 
backing.  
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4.1. Unionism and minimal explanatory realism 
We have articulated two versions of strong explanatory realism that don’t vitiate 
EXPLANATION. Importantly, these approaches to explanation are representational in 
nature. And we noted that being representational doesn’t make you not fully objective. 
Hence, one option available to unionists is to say that for some propositions to explainG 
some proposition is for there to be an explanatory model including these propositions 
that satisfies the aforementioned ontic condition. In this case, grounding, as a form of 
explanation, is backed by various ontic relations such as set formation, the determinate-
determinable relation, material constitution, and so on. Indeed, unionists might claim 
that grounding tracks determinationG, something that in their view the separatist 
wrongly identifies as grounding.  
On these proposals, grounding itself is representational in nature, which is something 
that some unionists may wish to reject. According to defenders of the so-called ontic 
conception of explanation, there is a type of fully objective explanation that isn’t 
representational in nature. Craver, for example, states that a causal explanation of this 
type is “a portion of the causal structure of the world” rather than an explanatory text 
describing this aspect of the world (2007, p. 27). Unionists of this stripe in effect adopt 
the ontic conception of explanation. For example, they might stipulate that explanation 
in general, and thus explanationG in particular, is a relation between facts (entities 
without semantic properties) rather than propositions (entities with semantic 
properties).  
Explanation on the ontic conception isn’t obscure, so it doesn’t render instances of 
INHERITANCE unlicensed. But, from the perspective of defending the usefulness of 
INHERITANCE, there is a drawback to working with the ontic conception in any case. To see 
why, let’s return to causal explanation. On the ontic conception of causal explanation, 
causal explanation just is causation, where causation is understood to be non-
representational in nature. Importantly, this just-is claim is intended to mark an 
asymmetry between the concepts of causal explanation and causation—the latter is 
prior to the former in that we’re to understand causal explanation in terms of causation 
rather than the other way around. The general thought is that considering causal 
explanation under the guise “causation” is theoretically useful in a way that considering 
causation under the guise “causal explanation” isn’t. In this case, causation is treated as 
a guide to explanation and not vice versa. Returning to grounding, if unionists embrace 
the ontic conception of explanationG, then they think that explanationG just is 
grounding, where grounding is understood to be non-representational in nature. And 
this just-is statement is intended to mark a corresponding asymmetry—the concept of 
grounding is prior to the concept of explanationG in that we’re to understand 
explanationG in terms of grounding rather the other way around. The general thought is 
that considering explanationG under the guise “grounding” is theoretically useful in a 
way that considering grounding under the guise “explanationG” isn’t. In this case, 
grounding is treated as a guide to explanation and not vice versa.17  
 
17 A related concern posed by Wilson (2018, p. 504) is this: if the notions of grounding and 
explanationG are quite close in meaning, the claim that grounding is explanationG is 
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So it seems that unionists are better off working with a broadly representational 
approach to explanation. Some unionists, however, might insist that weak rather than 
strong explanatory realism is true, endorsing something like Kim’s view on explanation. 
Interestingly, it may be that unionists can coherently endorse strong grounding realism 
even in this case. How so? Well, we haven’t said much about the “by its nature” part of 
the stipulation that something isn’t fully objective when it is by its nature subject 
involving. Perhaps this claim is most plausible when read as targeting the intuitive, 
broadly Aristotelian notion of essence, what Fine calls “constitutive essence” in 
particular (1995, p. 281).18 Plausibly, essence so understood is itself a notion of 
explanation: what is part of the nature of something in some sense helps to explain 
what it is to be that very thing (Fine 2015). Suppose that thought is correct. Then, as 
Skiles and Trogdon (2019) point out, from the fact that explanationG is essentially 
subject involving, it doesn’t follow that grounding is too, even if grounding just is 
explanationG. The reason is that explanatory language is generally agreed to be the sort 
that generates opaque contexts, since whether an explanation statement is true is 
sensitive to the way in which it represents the explanans and explanandum (Ruben 
1990, p. 219). Yet the view under consideration is precisely that the “... is essentially 
subject involving” position in the sentence “ExplanationG is essentially subject involving” 
is sensitive to the sorts of factors that render explanatory contexts opaque in general. If 
this position in the sentence is opaque, you cannot validly infer that grounding is 
essentially subject involving even if explanationG is and unionism is true. To do so would 
be to invalidly apply Leibniz’s Law within an opaque context.  
4.2. Further issues 
Let’s return to the conflation and coherence worries mentioned at the outset. As we see 
things, adopting the separatist framework straightforwardly addresses both concerns: 
there is no issue of conflation, as in this case we’re clearly distinguishing between 
grounding and explanation and the fully objective from the subject involving, and there 
is no issue of coherence either—in this case we aren’t saying, for example, that 
something is both fully objective and not fully objective. And, drawing from our 
discussion above, we can see that unionists have various options available to them as 
well. One option, as we’ve seen, is to identify grounding with a form of explanation that 
is representational in nature. In this case, unionists can still coherently maintain strong 
grounding realism, as being representational doesn’t make you not fully objective.    
A final implication of our discussion concerns causal theorizing. In theorizing about 
causation, it’s standard to assume that facts to the effect that this explains that obtain 
(minimal explanatory realism). It’s also fairly standard to distinguish facts about what 
causes what from facts about how we come to know the causal facts or whether context 
contributes to the truth conditions of our causal judgments (strong causal realism).19 It’s 
 
uninformative, so we aren’t going to be able learn anything interesting about grounding that 
we didn’t already know by making the sorts of inferences that INFERENCE concerns.   
18 See Jenkins 2005 for related discussion.   
19 For a notable exception to strong causal realism, see Price 2005; see also Bernstein 2018 
for related discussion. 
 15 
not unusual to appeal to principles corresponding to EXPLANATION and INFERENCE in 
making claims about the nature of causation. Schaffer (2012), for example, argues that, 
since causal explanation is contrastive in nature, so too is causation. What we’ve said 
about the interface between grounding and explanation plausibly applies to the 
interface between causation and explanation as well. So causal theorists who embrace 
strong causal realism, minimal explanatory realism, and appeal to a methodological 
principle corresponding to INHERITANCE don’t have to worry about a corresponding 
argument adapted for the causal domain.20  
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